Byzantion'dan Constantinopolis'e İstanbul Kuşatmaları

Editörler
Murat Arslan - Turhan Kaçar



İSTANBUL
ARAŞTIRMALARI
ENSTİTÜSÜ

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
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SUNUŞ

Kent tarihi araştırmaları, Titus Livius'un (MÖ 59-MS 17) Roma tarihini konu edinen *Ab Urbe Condita* (Kentin Kuruluşundan İtibaren) başlıklı 142 volümlük *magnum opus*'unu kaleme almasından itibaren son derece kritik bir noktada durur. Öyle ki, antikçağda kent tarihinden ulusal tarih yazımına geçişi simgeleyen Livius ekolünün Ortaçağ üzerinden Rönesans'a oradan da modern historiografi üzerinde var olan görünmez etkisi yadsınamaz.

Tarihte yer edinmiş bütün büyük kentler kuruluş evrelerinde tabiatıyla mütevazı yerleşimlerdir. Zaman içinde büyüyen ve gelişen Eskiçağ kentlerinin büyük çoğunluğu antikçağda önemlerini kaybetmiş veya küçülmüşlerdir. Çok az kent kuruluşundan itibaren stratejik, politik ve demografik niteliğini yitirmeden zamanın yok edici etkisine karşı direnmeyi başarabilmiştir. İstanbul da bunlardan birisidir.

Trak kökenli küçük bir balıkçı köyünün jeostratejik konumu itibariyle gelişmesi ve zaman içinde (MÖ VII. yüzyılın ilk yarısı) Hellen koloniciler tarafından iskân edilmesiyle birlikte Byzantion '*polis*' sıfatıyla tarih sahnesinde ön plana çıkmıştır. Kent, topografik ve hidrografik açıdan değerlendirildiğinde güvenlik ve zenginlik bakımından dünyada bilinen yerleşimlerin hemen hemen en elverişlilerinden biridir. Bu bakımdan antik Byzantion'dan modern İstanbul'a kadar, tarihin her döneminde farklı etnik unsurların bir araya geldiği ve kaynaştığı kent, renkli demografik yapısıyla kozmopolit bir '*metropolis*' olarak tanımlanabilir.

MÖ VII. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren Karadeniz ticaretinin ivme kazanması üzerine boğazlar üzerinden gerçekleştirilen emtia alışverişinden pay almak ve bu pazarı ekonomik anlamda kontrol altında tutmak önem kazanmıştır. Lokalizasyonu itibariyle bu dolaşımdan en büyük faydayı sağlayarak zenginleşen Byzantion, kısa süre içinde antikçağda adından söz edilen bir yerleşim halini almıştır. Ancak konumu ve refah düzeyi tarihin her döneminde bu zenginlikten pay almak isteyen ikincil güçlerin dikkatlerini de buraya çekmiştir. Zaman içinde sınırları konsantrik daireler şeklinde genişleyen kentin ünü ve itibarıyla doğru orantılı bir şekilde tehlikeli düşmanlarının sayısı ve gücü de artırmıştır. Bu bakımdan kent kuruluşundan itibaren en yakın komşuları Trakyalılardan başlayarak zamandizinsel sıralama içinde Hellenler, Persler, Makedonyalılardan

Hellenistik krallıklara ve Romalılara, Avarlar, Sâsâniler ile Araplardan Haçlılara ve Osmanlılara kadar çok sayıda kuşatmacıya karşı, son derece çetin çarpışmalar yapmak zorunda kalmıştır.

Konu Klasik ve Hellenistik dönemler olunca Byzantion öncelikle Persler (MÖ *ca*. 494), Hellen Pers Savaşları'ndan sonra (MÖ *ca*. 477/476) Spartalılar; Peloponnesos Savaşları ve hemen akabinde (MÖ 410/409; 389; 363) Atinalılar ve Spartalılar (MÖ 405; 403; 400) tarafından defaten kuşatılmış; bazen zapt edilmiş bazen iç çekişmeler ve ihanetle ele geçirilmiştir. Diğer yandan müttefiklerinden aldığı yardımlar, surlarının ve savunmasının sağlamlığı sayesinde II. Philippos'un hükümdarlığı sırasında (MÖ 340) Makedonya; Leonnorios önderliğindeki (MÖ *ca*. 278/277) Galatlar; Hellenistik krallıklar özelindeyse II. Antiokhos'un hükümdarlığı sırasında (MÖ *ca*. 251) Seleukos; I. Prusias'ın hükümdarlığı sırasında (MÖ *ca*. 220/219) Bithynia ve Rhodos; VI. Mithradates'in hükümdarlığı sırasında (MÖ *ca*. 89/88; 73/72) Mithradates hanedanlıklarının kuşatmalarını savuşturmayı başarmıştır. Ancak Byzantion gerek Hellenistik Dönem'de Romalı komutan Flaccus (MÖ 85) tarafından zorla gasp edilmiş gerekse Lucius Fabius Cilo tarafından Roma İmparatorluk Dönemi'nde (MS 193-195) uzun süre abluka altına alındıktan sonra teslim olmak zorunda kalmıştır.

Byzantion'un kaderi I. Constantinus'un kendi adına izafeten MS 11 Mayıs 330 yılında Roma İmparatorluğu'nun yeni başkenti olarak ilan edilmesiyle köklü bir biçimde değişmiştir. Kent Osmanlılar tarafından fethedilinceye kadar, Akdeniz ve Avrasya arasındaki stratejik konumundan dolayı, 1000 yıldan fazla süredir eski dünyanın en önemli çekim, cazibe ve yönetim merkezi olmuştur. Bu süre zarfında bilinen dünya '*terra cognita*' siyasetinin kalbinin attığı Constantinopolis ile kıyaslanabilecek herhangi bir yerleşim yoktur. Zira kent dönemin en önemli ticaret, sanat, teknoloji ve kültür merkezi konumundaydı. Para piyasalarında ve ticaret borsalarında emtiaların fiyatların belirlendiği, sanat akımlarının yayıldığı ve ürünlerinin sergilendiği, silah ve savunma sistemlerinin geliştirildiği, kütüphanecilik çalışmalarının sürdürüldüğü, eğitim ve bilim üzerine araştırmaların yapıldığı, teolojik tartışmaların kanonlarının belirlendiği ve Akdeniz politikalarının şekillendiği bir başkentti. Dolayısıyla, Constantinus öncesi dönemin mütevazı Byzantion kent devletini kuşatmakla, Avrasya ve Akdeniz arasındaki Bizans İmparatorluğu'nun başkentini kuşatmak hiç şüphesiz çok farklı siyasal hedeflerdi. Bilhassa MS XIII. yüzyılın başına kadarki Constantinopolis kuşatmaları, Bizans İmparatorluğu'nun tasavvur ettiği dış politika eylemlerine tepkiyi de ifade ediyordu. Öyle ki, bu kuşatmalar aynı zamanda bilinen dünyanın merkezini ele geçirme kalkışmaları olarak da görülüyordu.

Constantinopolis kuşatmaları, tam da bu noktada hiç şüphesiz savunma sistemlerini de dikkate almayı gerektirmektedir. Başkentin savunulmasının önemi, daha kuruluşundan anlaşılmış ve bu bağlamda kentin büyütülmesine paralel olarak savunma sisteminin başat yapısını teşkil eden surlar yenilenip, genişletilerek daha muhkem hale getirilmiştir. Bugünkü surların ortaya çıkışında hiç kuşkusuz MS V. yüzyıldaki güncel siyasi istikrarsızlıkların rolü belirleyiciydi. Roma kentinin MS 410 yılında Gotlar tarafından yağmalanması Constantinopolis için tam anlamıyla bir alarmdı. Bu bakımdan nüfusu artan ve eski sur dışına taşan başkent, Balkanlardan gelebilecek olası bir tehdide karşı yeni bir savunma sistemiyle tahkim edildi. Bunun önemi ve caydırıcı rolü Hunların MS 447'de Constantinopolis üzerine yürüme girişimlerinde ortaya çıktı. Afrika'nın MS 430'lu yıllarda Vandallar tarafından fethi, Roma açısından Akdeniz'i de istikrarsızlaştırmıştı ve Constantinopolis'teki idarenin buna karşı tedbiri ise MS 439 yılında deniz surlarını inşa etmek oldu. Batı'nın başkenti Roma'nın MS 455'de Vandallar tarafından yağmalanması, Constantinopolis için deniz surlarının hayati önemini göstermektedir. Anastasius zamanında (MS 507-512) Marmara kıyısındaki Selymbria (Silivri) yakınlarından Karadeniz'e kadar ulaşan 'Uzun Sur' bir başka korunma kademesini, bilhassa *thema* sistemi vasıtasıyla Trakya ve Bithynia'da bulunan sahra orduları vasıtasıyla derin kara savunmasını teşkil ediyordu. Constantinopolis halkının savunmaya katılımı ve istihbarat faaliyetleri gibi hususları dikkate alındığında başkentin savunulmasının aslında ne kadar çok yönlü ve kademeli olarak tasarlandığı görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, Bizans İmparatorluğu'nun merkezine yönelik abluka girişimlerinin ve kuşatmaların MS 1204'e ve hatta MS 1453'e kadar başarısız olmasının özünde iki temel faktör ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bunda surların sağlamlığı, düşmanlarının kuşatma tekniklerinin ve askeri stratejilerinin yetersizliği kadar kentin hem kara hem de deniz tarafındaki çok yönlü savunma sistemlerinin fonksiyonu büyüktür.

Kitapta yer alan çalışmalar, sadece Constantinopolis'in kimler tarafından nasıl kuşatıldığı sorusu üzerinde durmayıp, aynı zamanda ilgili kuşatmalar esnasındaki siyasi çekişmelere ve başkentin savunma unsurlarına dikkat çekmektedir. Başkent sadece dışarıdan gelenler tarafından değil, iç savaşlar sırasında da sıklıkla kuşatıldı. Bu durum Bizans İmparatorluğu'nun uzun tarihindeki iç çatışmalar esnasında ortaya çıkan kuşatmalara bir bütün olarak bakmayı zorunlu kılmaktadır. Constantinopolis'in kara surları antikçağdan itibaren en fazla Balkanlardan gelen girişimlere karşı dayandı. Hunlar her ne kadar surlar önüne kadar ilerleyemeseler de, Avarlar bunu başardılar. Bizans İmparatorluğu'nun Balkanlarda izlediği karmaşık diplomasiye bir tepki olan Avar kuşatması, Sâsânilerin de katılımıyla

adeta bir dünya savaşına ve "krize" dönüştü. Avar kuşatmasını izleyen yıllarda Güney Arabistan'da mayalanan İslam gücü, kısa sürede Constantinopolis önlerinde ortaya çıktı. İslam'ın ortaya çıkışıyla birlikte, Doğu Akdeniz'de başat bir güç konumuna erişen Müslümanların Constantinopolis kuşatmaları, sadece İslam–Bizans çatışmaları olarak değil, aynı zamanda Akdeniz dünyasını kontrol altına alma mücadelesi olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bununla birlikte Bizans, daha önce de ifade edildiği gibi, bir Akdeniz imparatorluğu olduğu kadar bir Avrasya imparatorluğuydu. Doğuda Hazarlardan batıda Bulgarlara uzanan bir dizi askeri-diplomatik ilişkiler, Bizans dünyasını Hunlar, Avarlar ve Göktürklerin bıraktığı boşluğa yerleşen Bulgarlar ve Ruslarla karşı karşıya getirdi. Bu bağlamda Bizans'ın kuzeyindeki dünyayla kurduğu siyasi ve askeri ilişkilerin sonuçları MS IX. yüzyılda Bulgarların Constantinopolis'i "abluka altına almaları" ve MS X. yüzyılda ise Rusların kuşatma girişimleri çerçevesinde değerlendirilmektedir. Bizans İmparatorluğu, Haçlı seferlerinin başlamasıyla birlikte bilhassa Venedik açısından 'Bizans Sorununa' dönüştü. Komnenos Hanedanlığı'nın ilk temsilcileri Haçlıları başkente almadılarsa da, bu 'etkileyici başkent' MS 1203 ve MS 1204'te sadece Haçlıların doğrudan saldırısıyla değil, aynı zamanda Constantinopolis içerisindeki siyasi rekabetin de bir sonucu olarak Haçlılarca hileyle zapt edildi. Bu durum Bizans devletinin merkezinin geçici olarak İznik'e taşınmasına ve başkentlerini geri alıncaya (MS 1261) kadar bir dizi teşebbüste bulunmalarına neden oldu. Osmanlıların Constantinopolis'i abluka altına almaları ise, sadece fetih öncesi ve fethin genel kronolojik tarihi perspektifinin yanı sıra muhasaralar sırasında Bizans başkentinin sosyal hayatına ilişkin sistematik gözlemler ve bilhassa son kuşatma sırasındaki istihbarat faaliyetleri ışığında çok farklı kaynaklar özelinde ele alınmaktadır.

Sonuç itibariyle Bizans, Hellenlerin ve Romalıların temsil ettiği Batı dünyası ile Parthlar, Sâsâniler ve Arapların şekillendirdiği Doğu dünyası arasında adeta arafta konumlandırılmaktadır. Öyle ki, Bizans batıdan bakılınca doğu, doğudan bakılınca batı imparatorluğu olarak addedilir. Bu önyargı nedeniyle gerek batı gerek doğu gerekse bu kültür coğrafyasının mirasçıları olan bizler tarafından ötekileştirilen Bizans dünyası ve elbette başkentinin tarihi uzunca bir süre layıkıyla araştırılmamıştır. Buna karşın son zamanlarda Bizans ve İstanbul tarihi araştırmalarına yönelik gerek uluslararası gerekse ulusal çevrelerde giderek artan bir ilginin varlığı dikkat çekmektedir. Jonathan Shepard'ın derlediği *The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire*; Liz James'in hazırladığı *A Companion to Byzantium*; Türkiye'de ise, İSAM'ın öncülüğünde ve genel editörlüğünü Coşkun Yılmaz'ın yaptığı uluslararası katılımlı on ciltlik *Antik Çağ'dan XXI. Yüzyıla Büyük İstanbul Tarihi* gibi çalışmalar bu ilginin somut göstergelerinin sadece bir kaçıdır.

Sonuç olarak, elinizdeki bu kitap ise Bizans ve Constantinopolis'in siyasi tarihinden ziyade sadece tek bir tema üzerine odaklanmakta ve kentin yaklaşık iki bin yıllık geçmişinde karşı karşıya kaldığı kuşatmaların tamamını tek tek ele almamasına rağmen kaynaklarda ön plana çıkanlar üzerine bir tür tam görünüm '*panoptikon*' sunmaktadır. Eskiçağ ve Ortaçağ tarihi araştırmalarında gün geçtikçe öne çıkan antik kaynak, epigrafik belge ve nümismatik buluntu çeşitliliğini dikkate alan ve güncel literatüre dayanan tematik bir incelemedir. İleride kuşatmalar üzerine yapılacak daha kapsamlı analitik çalışmaların önemli bir çıkış noktası olma temennisi kitabın hazırlanış sürecinde editörlerin hem ümidi hem de çabalarının itici gücü olmuştur.

Murat Arslan – Turhan Kaçar

SEIZURES AND SIEGES OF BYZANTIUM IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD: FROM PAUSANIAS UNTIL PHILIPPUS II

Murat Arslan*

Pausanias' Seizure of Byzantium (ca. 477/476 B.C.)

Two years after the suppression of the Ionian Revolt in 492 B.C., the Persian army commanded by Mardonius launched an expedition against Thrace, thereby strengthening Persian dominance in the region. In actuality, this was the initial campaign for the Persians, intending to conquer the Athenians and so Hellas, as the Athenians had aided the Western Anatolian cities during the course of the Ionian rebelli on against Persian rule[1]. Because Darius never forgot how the Athenians, collaborating with Aristagoras, had plundered and burnt Sardis including its temples. The Persian king sought vengence against the Athenians, the supporters of the rebels. Darius, to prevent himself forgetting the call for vengeance these events provoked, ordered one of his servants to remind him of this three times each day, saying as his meals were set before him Δέσποτα, μέμνεο τῶν Ἀθηναίων=*Master, remember the Athenians*[2]!

Darius sent the Persian fleet commanded by Datis and Artaphrenes to Hellas in 490 B.C. with the fleet under the command of the exiled former tyrant of Athens, Hippias. The Persians set sail from the Cyclades for Euboia (Eğriboz) and Attica to request from the peoples of Hellas earth and water[3] and to punish the Athenians. However, in this same year, the battle on the plain of Marathon was fought, *ca*. 42 km. to the northeast of Athens, where the Persians were defeated by

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1 This article is based on the account given in my book *İstanbul'un Antikçağ Tarihi: Klasik ve Hellenistik Dönemler*. İstanbul 2010. Hdt. VI. 42–45.

2 Hdt. V. 105.

3 In antiquity, the expression, to "*give earth and water*" meant making submission of the kingdom or city state to Persian authority.

the Athenians and Plataians commanded by Miltiades[4]. This defeat only served to further encourage the Persians and in 481 B.C., under the command of the Persian king Xerxes, another major campaign was undertaken against Hellas. Passing over the Hellespontus into Europe[5] by means of two bridges of boats, the Persian army passed through Thrace and Thessalia, advancing against Attica. On land at Thermopylai[6] and at sea off Artemisium[7] the Persians conquered and captured Athens in revenge for the burning of Sardis, destroyed Athens, demolishing the city walls and plundering and burning the temples[8]. Following this however at the Battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. the Persian fleet was defeated by the Athenians and their allies led by Themistocles, who had withdrawn to the island of Salamis[9]. After leaving Mardonius in command of Hellas, Xerxes departed, firstly to Sardis in Western Anatolia[10] and then he returned to the center of his empire at Susa[11]. Mardonius remained in Thessalia with a large army[12] and on August the 27th 479 B.C. Mardonius and his allies were heavily defeated in Boiotia at the Battle of Plataia by the Greek army commanded by the Spartan regent Pausanias[13] leaving Mardonius and most of his troops dead in battle[14]. On this same day (or in very close in time) the Greek fleet under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides, landed at Cape of Mycale (Samsun) near Miletus. He defeated the Persians stationed there and burnt their ships[15]. Some cities in Western Anatolia in the aftermath of this victory revolted against the Persians, as in the Ionian Revolt and again declared their independence from the Persian empire[16].

When Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, among the commanders of Mardonius saw the Persians' departing from the field of battle at Plataia, he had withdrawn with his army of approximately 40.000 soldiers towards Phocis. He marched rapidly through Thessalia and Macedonia to Thrace with the aim of reaching as rapidly as possible the strategic Hellespontus[17]. From Thrace his army continued along the Çanakkale Straits and succeeded in reaching Byzantium which was still under Persian control[18]. Resting in Byzantium for a short time he passed over to the Anatolian side[19] and led his army back to Persia.

Following the Battle of Mycale in 479 B.C., the Hellenic fleet led by Leotychides decided to sail towards the bridges which had been constructed to connect Asia to Europe over the Hellespontus as they thought these pontoon bridges of ships were still intact. Also they planned to secure the Çanakkale Straits and Chersonesus (The Gelibolu Peninsula) from Persian rule[20]. When the fleet reached Abydus on the coast of the Hellespontus, they discovered the bridges had been broken up and in consequence Leotychides decided to sail back to Lacedaimonia with his Peloponnesian allies[21]. The Athenians under the command of Xanthippus moved to drive the Persians out of Chersonesus. They joined forces with their allies from Ionia and Hellespontus forming a strong fleet. When news of the Hellenic fleet in the Çanakkale Strait reached Chersonesus, most of the

4 Hdt. VI. 94–117; Thuc. I. 18. 1; *FGrHist* IIIC 688 F 13 (22) '*Ctesias*'; Iust. II. 9. 8–21; also see Tzet. *Chil*. I. lines 860–871.
When Darius heard of the defeat, his hatred of the Athenians for their attack on Sardis was converted into a fiery indignation and he began immediately to prepare for a major invasion of Hellas. He spent the next three years in obtaining and preparing the soldiers, warships and logistics. But in the fourth year of preparation, the outbreak of the revolt in Egypt and then the fighting over the succession between his sons delayed Darius' Hellas Expedition, and then in the middle of everything, he died in 486 B.C. when the kingdom passed to Xerxes, his son by his consort Atossa (Hdt. VII. 1–4).

5 Hdt. VII. 33–36; 54–57; Mela II. 26; Plin. *nat*. IV. 12 [75]; also see Amm. Marc. XXII. 8. 4; XXIII. 6. 8 fn. 3; Tzet. *Chil*. I. lines 888–910.

6 Hdt. VII. 210–234; *FGrHist* IIIC 688 F 13 (27) '*Ctesias*'; Diod. XI. 6. 3–11. 6; Iust. II. 11. 1–18; also see Tzet. *Chil*. I. lines 959–973.

7 Hdt. VIII. 1–18; also see Thuc. III. 54. 4; Diod. XI. 12. 2–13. 2.

8 Hdt. VIII. 51–56; Aeschin. *Fals. Leg.* 172; Iust. II. 11. 19–12. 11; Diod. XI. 13. 2–15. 2.

9 Hdt. VIII. 70–96; *FGrHist* IIIC 688 F 13 (30) '*Ctesias*'; Iust. II. 12. 12–13. 1; Diod. XI. 15. 4–19. 5; Plut. *Them*. X. 5–XV. 2; also see Tzet. *Chil*. I. lines 974–1000.

10 Hdt. VIII. 100–117; IX. 107; *FGrHist* IIIC 688 F 13 (31) '*Ctesias*'; also see Diod. XI. 19. 6; Iust. II. 13. 2–12; Amm. Marc. XXIII. 6. 8; Tzet. *Chil*. II. lines 1–8.

11 Hdt. IX. 108; *FGrHist* IIIC 688 F 13 (32) '*Ctesias*'; Diod. XI. 36. 7; also see Tzet. *Chil*. II. lines 9–13.

12 Hdt. VIII. 113; also see Diod. XI. 19. 6 fn. 2; Iust. II. 14. 1–4.

13 According to Herodotus (IX. 10), the leadership then belonged nominally to Pleistarchus, the son of Leonidas. But he was only a boy. Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, his guardian was his cousin and was the regent. On this, also see Diod. XI. 29. 4; Corn. Nep. IV. 2. 3 fn. 3 "*Pausanias*".

14 Hdt. IX. 47–71; also see Thuc. I. 89. 2 fn. 4; 130. 1; 132. 2–3; II. 71. 2–4; III. 4; Diod. XI. 28. 1–31. 3; Plut. *Arist*. XVII. 1–XIX. 3; Paus. V. 23. 1; Ath. *Deip*. IV. 138 *b–d*; *FGrHist* IIIB 432 F 9 (15) '*Nymphis*'=Ath. *Deip*. XII. 536 *a*; also see Iust. II. 14. 4–6.

15 Hdt. IX. 90–106; Thuc. I. 89. 2; Diod. XI. 34. 1–36. 7; Iust. II. 14. 7–9; also see Plut. *Per*. III. 1.

16 Hdt. IX. 90–106; Diod. XI. 34. 1–36. 7.

17 Hdt. IX. 66; also see Diod. XI. 33. 1; Plut. *Arist*. XIX. 4.

18 Hdt. IX. 89; also see Polyain. *strat*. VII. 30. 3 "*Artabazus*".
According to Herodotus (IX. 89), during the flight of Artabazus, some of his soldiers were cut down by the Thracians while others were overcome by hunger and fatigue.

19 Hdt. IX. 89.

20 Hdt. IX. 106–107.

21 Hdt. IX. 114; Thuc. I. 89. 2; also see Diod. XI. 37. 4.

population and the Persians gathered at Sestus, one of the best fortified castles in the region[22].

Sestus, protected by the Persian satrap Aryandes, was blockaded by the Athenians and their allies by both land and by sea. The Athenians and their allies spent the winter of 479/478 B.C. in front of the walls of Sestus. At last the Persians commanded by Aryandes, who could no longer withstand the privations of this siege, at night secretly left Sestus and fled towards Byzantium, the strongest and the best fortified city remaining under their control in Thrace. The Hellenic forces commanded by Athens took Sestus and then pursued Aryandes and caught up with the satrap and the remaining portion of his soldiers near Aigos potamoi (Karaköy). Some of the Persians were killed during the fight while the satrap and his children were captured alive, the other Persian commander Oinabazus had fled towards Thrace and he was also taken captive by the Thracians. The Thracians sacrificed Oinabazus to Pleistorus, their autochthonous deity. Aryandes was crucified near Sestus at the place where the bridge of ships was constructed. In consequence, by *ca*. 479 B.C. the Persians to a large extent were expelled from the Hellespontus and in consequence the Athenian fleet and its allies departed from the straits returning to their ports of origin[23].

Following the departure of the Persians, the Athenians, following the counsel of Themistocles, enclosed their city in fortified walls constructed between 479–

22 Hdt. IX. 115; also see Diod. XI. 37. 4.

23 Hdt. IX. 116–119; Thuc. I. 89. 2; also see Diod. XI. 37. 5.
According to Plutarch (*Cim*. IX. 2–4), during the conquest of Sestus and the chase after the fleeing Persian army, many Persians were taken prisoners by the Athenians and their allies. The task of equally distributing the prisoners to the army was given to Cimon. Cimon ordered the Persian captives to be undressed. He put into one lot the captives and into another their robes, money, richly decorated arms made from precious materials and their valuable adorments. When he was about to draw lots, the allies accused him of making an unequal distribution. Thereupon Cimon told them to choose one of the lots and that the Athenians would be content with whichever was left. So, on the advice of Herophytus of Samos, the allies chose the Persian wealth. While the allies took the gold armors, armlets, anklets, collars, quality clothes, purple robes, etc., the Athenians obtained only naked bodies, ill-trained for labour and so the Athenians became really angry. They even called Cimon a '*ridiculous distributer*'. But a little while later, when the friends and kinsmen of the captives came from Phrygia and Lydia, they ransomed every one of the captives at a great price. In consequence of the ransom money Cimon had 4 month's pay and rations for his fleet and also he had more gold and ornaments which were much more than the allies had taken for themselves.

478 B.C. taking all necessary measures to defend their city[24]. At that time the Spartans sent the regent Cleombrotus, son of Pausanias, with 20 ships from the Peloponnesus to Attica as the commander of the Hellenic fleet[25]. In Attica 30 *triereis* of Athens under the leadership of Cimon, son of Miltiades, and Lysimachus, son of Aristeides, together with many warships of the allies joined the fleet and this fleet commanded by Pausanias set sail towards Cyprus. Most of the island was subdued and from Cyprus they sailed to Byzantium, which remained under Persian rule[26]. When they reached the Hellespontus, they expelled all the Persian garrisons from either side of the straits[27]. They lay at anchor off Byzantium and besieged Byzantium by both land and sea, the last and the best fortified Persian base in Thrace and Europe. Following a harsh siege directed in accord with Pausanias' orders, they occupied the city in 478 B.C.[28].

During the subjugation of Byzantium, the Hellenes took many Persian captives including Persian noblemen, the relatives of the Persian king Xerxes and his allies. Pausanias organised their escape from prison in Byzantium with his accomplice in this matter, Gongylus of Eretria, whom he had placed in charge of governing Byzantium and supervising the prisoners of war. But he told his allies,

24 Thuc. I. 89. 3–93. 8; Diod. XI. 39. 2–40. 4; Iust. II. 15. 1–10.

25 According to Iustinus (II. 15. 13–14) the Spartans sought revenge for the two Persian attacks against Hellas and took the initiative and decided to launch raids into Persian ruled territory with the army sent by the Spartans which was commanded by Pausanias. The other allies also designated Pausanias commander of the expedition. According to Demosthenes (*Neaer*. LIX. 96–98 [1377–1378]), although the Athenians played an essential role in saving the Hellenes from Persian rule in the Persian wars, Pausanias was selected as the commander of the united Hellenic fleet. At that time the Athenians said nothing concerning this decision, in part because they were afraid that it would cause jealousy and divisions of opinion among the allies and, in part, because of their unwillingness to oppose the Spartans.

26 Thuc. I. 94. 1–2; Diod. XI. 44. 1–3; Corn. Nep. IV. 2. 1 "*Pausanias*".
According to Plutarch (*Arist*. XXIII. 1; *Cim*. VI. 1; 3), Aristeides was also sent out as commander of this fleet together with Cimon. According to Diodorus (XI. 44. 2), Pausanias sailed from the Peloponnesus Peninsula to Athens with 50 *triereis* in total, where the Athenians joined Pausanias's fleet with a fleet of 30 ships commanded by Aristeides.
According to Iustinus (II. 15. 16), the Athenian general Aristeides shared with Pausanias the responsibility of conducting the war against the Persians.

27 Corn. Nep. IV. 2. 2 "*Pausanias*".

28 Thuc. I. 94. 1–2; 128. 5; Diod. XI. 44. 3; Corn. Nep. IV. 2. 2 "*Pausanias*".
Iustinus, who summarizes Pompeius Trogus' work (IX. 1. 3), misinterprets this situation and states that Byzantium was founded by the Spartan king Pausanias and stayed under his rule for 7 years (also see Oros. *hist*. III. 13. 2). And then he states the victory and the authority in Byzantium was handed over in the course of time, and the city fell sometimes under Spartan and sometimes Athenian rule.

who were investigating the escape that the prisoners had seized an opportunity to escape. Escorted by Gongylus, Pausanias sent the king's relatives and nobles secretly to Xerxes, together with a letter carried by Gongylus to be given in person to Xerxes[29], which read as follows[30]:

> "Pausanias, the general of Sparta, is sending you these prisoners of war in order to do you a favour. What I desire is; If it is agreeable to you, to marry your daughter and to make Sparta and Hellas subject to you. I think I am able to do this with your cooperation. If my offer pleases you, send a trustworthy man to the sea through whom we may in the future conduct our correspondence".

Xerxes was very pleased to have his imprisoned relatives returned home and so he responded positively to Pausanias's offers. Xerxes replaced Megabates, the former satrap of the coast of Asia Minor with Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, who was appointed by him to be the satrap of Dascyleium (Ergili). As after the defeat at Plataia, Artabazus had reached Asia Minor via Byzantium and had returned to Persia a little earlier, Xerxes entrusted him with a letter to be delivered to Pausanias at Byzantium as quickly and secretly as possible and to show him the royal seal on the letter. He told him that if Pausanias gave him any order concerning his own affairs, he was to execute it with all due diligence and faithfulness[31]. When Artabazus arrived at Dascyleium as satrap, he did exactly

29 Thuc. I. 128. 5–6; Corn. Nep. IV. 2. 2 "*Pausanias*"; also see Diod. XI. 44. 3; Plut. *Cim*. VI. 2.
According to Plutarch (*Cim*. IX. 2), as with the capture of Sestus, when Byzantium was being conquered, many Persians were taken prisoners by the Athenians and their allies. Cimon was appointed to the task of distributing the captives to the army and he did the same as at Sestus, distributing the captives and their valuable adornments to the army. For more detailed information, see Plut. *Cim*. IX. 2–4; also Meritt *et al*. 1950, 237 fn. 16.
And according to Iustinus (II. 15. 14), after the Spartan commander Pausanias was assigned by his Greek allies as the commander-in-chief, in the war against the Persians; Pausanias used his authority as commander to establish a monarchic rule over all Hellas and began to bargain with Xerxes. To show his good faith and determination to the Persian king, he sent all his Persian captives back to Xerxes.

30 Thuc. I. 128. 7. According to the citation of Thucydides by Cornelius Nepos (IV. 2. 2 "*Pausanias*"), the contents of Pausanias letter to Xerxes was as follows: "*After Pausanias, the general of Sparta captured Byzantium, as soon as he learnt that some of the captives were your* [Xerxes] *relatives, he sent them to you as a gift and he desires to create a kinship with you by marriage. So; if this pleases you, too, give your daughter in marriage. If you do this, he* [Pausanias] *guarantees that with your help he will make Sparta and all Hellas subject to you. If you wish to think about this offer, send him* [Pausanias] *a trustworthy man of yours with whom he may discuss this matter*".

31 Thuc. I. 129. 1; Corn. Nep. IV. 2. 2 "*Pausanias*".

as he was told. He saw to it that the letter was transmitted to Pausanias in Byzantium[32]. Xerxes' reply was as follows[33]:

> "From Xerxes, the king of Persia to Pausanias: The favour you have done me in saving the captives who were taken at Byzantium beyond the sea deserves the greatest debt of gratitude that has ever recorded in my house. And your offers please me. Let neither day nor night hinder you from fulfilling your promises. Do not let anything prevent you from fulfilling your promises. Let neither the amount of gold, nor silver, nor the number of soldiers required stop you. Trust the honesty of Artabazus I have sent to you. Follow the best course of action for my honour and welfare and for your own".

Pausanias, given a considerable amount of money by the Persian king in addition to his letter[34], diligently undertook to realize this conspiracy of his own design, but his subsequent actions when he was striving to perfect his plans made the Lacedaimonians suspect he was collaborating with the Persians[35]. As Pausanias had already gained a high reputation among the Hellenes when he was in command at Plataia, he then became exceedingly arrogant after receiving this letter from Xerxes and he stopped living according to the Spartan and Hellenic traditions in which he had been brought up and he began to wear Persian apparel and behaved like a Persian man[36], his meals taken in the Persian fashion and it became

32 Thuc. I. 129. 2. According to Cornelius Nepos (IV. 2. 2 "*Pausanias*"): Xerxes gave Artabazus a letter and dispatched him to Pausanias. In this letter he thanked the Spartan general and requested him not to be discouraged by any difficulties but to fulfill his plans. He also stated if the general successfully completed his plans, the great king would grant him whatever he wished.

33 Thuc. I. 129. 3.
According to Herodotus (V. 32) Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus wanted to marry the daughter of Xerxes' nephew, Megabates after he became the tyrant of all Hellas. In Xerxes' letter to Pausanias cited by Thucydides (I. 129. 3), there is no mention of this girl or of the marriage. According to Diodorus (XI. 44. 3) Pausanias, who had secretly formed a treaty of friendship with Xerxes, would also marry the king's daughter and for this reason, he betrayed Hellas (also see Diod. XI. 46. 1; 3). While according to Iustinus (II. 15. 14) Pausanias, who wanted to establish monarchic rule over Hellas, began to negociate with the Persian king and, in exchange for his betrayal, he would marry Xerxes daughter.
On the correspondence between Pausanias and Xerxes, also see Plut. *Them*. XXIII. 1–3. For more detailed information, see Konishi 1970, 63 ff.

34 Diod. XI. 44. 4.

35 Diod. XI. 44. 4; Corn. Nep. IV. 2. 2 "*Pausanias*"; also see Plut. *Cim*. VI. 2–3.

36 Thuc. I. 130. 1; Diod. XI. 44. 5; 46. 2–3; Corn. Nep. IV. 2. 3 "*Pausanias*"; *FGrHist* IIA 76 F 14 '*Duris*'=Ath. *Deip*. XII. 535 *e*; *FGrHist* IIIB 432 F 9 (15) '*Nymphis*'=Ath. *Deip*. XII. 536 *a*; also see Thuc. I. 132. 2; Lycurg. *Leocr*. 128–129; Ath. *Deip*. XII. 543 *b*.

evident he could no longer contain his ambition, showing through little things indications of the greater designs he was meditating upon, displayed hubris such that no one would come near him[37].

Athenaius, citing from the sixth book of *Nymphis,* the historian of Heracleia Pontica (Karadeniz Ereğlisi)[38], provides the following explanation of Pausanias' state of mind at this time as follows: After he defeated Mardonius at Plataia, while he was living in an arrogant manner at Byzantium ignoring Spartan rules, he dedicated at the mouth of the Black Sea a bronze cauldron to the 12 gods and on this cauldron, of a size to easily hold 100 *amphoras,* the arrogant and pleasure-stricken Pausanias in pride inscribed this epigram[39]:

> "μνᾶμ' ἀρετᾶς ἀνέθηκε Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι/ Παυσανίας, ἄρχων Ἑλλάδος εὐρυχόρου, /πόντου ἐπ' Εὐξείνου, Λακεδαιμόνιος γένος,/ υἱὸς Κλεομβρότου, ἀρχαίας Ἡρακλέος γενεᾶς.
>
> Pausanias; by descent of ancient Heracles, leader of vast Hellas, the son of Cleombrotus, the descendant of Lacedaimon erected this monument of his bravery for the master Poseidon on the Pontus Euxinus".

This, amongst many other things, caused the allies in Asia Minor, as along the coastlines of the Hellespontus, to leave Sparta and transfer their alliegance to the Athenians under the command of Aristeides and Cimon[40] as both the Ionians

37 Thuc. I. 95. 4; 130. 1–2; Plut. *Arist*. XXIII. 1–3; *Cim*. VI. 2; Corn. Nep. IV. 2. 3 "*Pausanias*"; *FGrHist* IIIB 432 F 9 (15) '*Nymphis*'=Ath. *Deip*. XII. 536 *a-b*.
Since Pausanias, like other despots of the east, surrounded himself with court dignitaries, 'he made himself difficult to approach' [δυσπρόσοδόν τε αὐτὸν παρεῖχε] (Thuc. I. 130. 2). For more detailed information, see Gomme 1971[5], 433.

38 *FGrHist* IIIB 432 F 9 (15) '*Nymphis*'=Ath. *Deip*. XII. 536 *a-b*. For more detailed information, see Müller 1990[2], 78.

39 *FGrHist* IIIB 432 F 9 (15) '*Nymphis*'=Ath. *Deip*. XII. 536 *b*.
Herodotus (IV. 81) mentions this offering, in recording that in Exampaius, somewhere between Borysthenes (Dinyeper) and Hypanis (Bug/Bog) there is a cauldron that is 6 times as large as the bronze cauldron at the mouth of the Straits presented to the gods by Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus. On this subject, also see Müller 1990[2], 78.
After his victories at Plataia and Salamis, Pausanias had incribed on the *tripod*=the three legged cauldron dedicated in honor of Apollon in Delphi an epigram that showed his hubris (Dem. *Neaer*. LIX 96–97 [1377–1378]). This epigram was, "*Pausanias, the leader of Hellenes, after having destroyed the Median army, dedicated this monument to Phoibos*". Thuc. I. 132; Hdt. IX. 81; Plut. *mor*. XI. 873 *c*: *De Herodoti Malignitate* 42; Paus. III. 8. 2; *Anth. Graec.* VI. 197.

40 Thuc. I. 95. 4; 130. 1–2; Plut. *Arist*. XXIII. 1–3; *Cim*. VI. 2; Corn. Nep. IV. 2. 3 "*Pausanias*"; also see Hdt. VIII. 3. 2.

and those who had just freed themselves from the great king's control had been outraged by Pausanias' arrogant actions, tyrannical rule and caprice since the capture of Byzantium. The allies, especially the Chians, Samians and Lesbians[41] had warned the Athenians that something must be done to put an end to Pausanias' harshness and the Athenians accepted their demand. They took the necessary measures. Of the Athenian commanders, Aristeides was respected for his kind, humane and just behaviour and Cimon more for his tolerance towards the allies and trustworthy personage than for his actual military abilities and it was the character of these two commanders that drew the allies toward the Athenians[42].

Plutarch states (*Cim*. VI. 3), at that time the Athenian commanders in Byzantium, Cimon and Aristeides sent envoys to the *ephoroi*[43] in Sparta. These envoys emphasized that due to Pausanias' arrogant conduct and rule, Sparta had lost credibility in the eyes of the allies and in consequence of this Hellas was in confusion. The envoys urged the necessity of recalling Pausanias to Sparta as soon as was possible and according to Diodorus (XI. 44. 5–6), eventually even many soldiers of the coalition league under the command of Pausanias and many cities could no longer support the Spartan commander's tyrannical conduct and ruthlessness and so they started to desert him, with the commanders and soldiers returning to the Peloponnesus where they reported on the situation in the assemblies of people. Consequently, the cities sent groups of envoys, one after another to Sparta complaining about Pausanias' unacceptable conduct in Byzantium. It was an opportunity for Athens which the Athenian commander and statesman Aristeides employed very well as he organized a series of conferences open to the public. He also spoke in the city assemblies and due to his personal relations and efforts, he managed to attach many small city states to Athens, which had left Sparta[44].

So the Lacedaimonians asked Pausanias to defend himself against these charges of injustice he had committed in Byzantium and other cities and they recalled him to stand trial[45]. They ordered Pausanias to immediately leave Byzantium and

41 Plut. *Arist*. XXIII. 3–5.

42 On this subject see also Hammond 1967, 49 ff.

43 *Ephoros* [ὁ ἔφορος] literally means 'overseer, guardian, supervisor and ruler'. The *ephoroi* were 5 administrative officers elected annually in Lacedaimonian and Dorian states. The *ephoroi* had authority not only over all the other officers but even over the kings themselves.

44 Diod. XI. 45. 4–5; 46. 1; 4–5.

45 Thuc. I. 95. 3; 131. 1; also see Diod. XI. 44. 5–6; Plut. *Cim*. VI. 3; *Arist*. XXIII. 1–6; Corn. Nep. IV. 2. 2–3 "*Pausanias*". On the subject, also see Fornara 1983[2], 59 ff. n° 61.
According to Iustinus (II. 15. 16), Aristeides, the Athenian general and joint commander with Pausan-

his task at the Çanakkale Straits and return to Sparta[46]. From the envoys who came repeatedly to Lacedaimonia accusing Pausanias of unjust dealing, of executing his task of command as if he were a despot and of his tyrannical desires, this seems to have been an especially well-founded complaint[47].

Pausanias departed from Byzantium dressed as a Persian and, passing through Thrace, he was followed by both the Persian and Egyptian attendants as well as by the Spartans[48]. However for some unknown reason Pausanias was compelled unexpectedly to return to Byzantium. Through the soldiers under his command and his authority he easily took control of the city and he continued to rule over Byzantium like a tyrant. When the Lacedaimonians heard this, they used this as an excuse to once again recall him[49]. With the exception of the Peloponnessian soldiers, at this time all the allies from personal spite towards Pausanias had sided with the Athenian commanders Cimon and Aristeides[50]. Due to the personal efforts of Aristeides and Cimon, the Athenians had persuaded the cities that had revolted against the Persians on the Hellespontus, on the islands and in Anatolia to side with them, united under Athenian command. Due both to its strategic location and the Black Sea trade, Byzantium was extremely important to the Athenians. If they became allies with Byzantium, after the Hellespontus they would also take control of the Bosporus as the exercise of domination over these straits was to control the key point in trade between the Black Sea and the Aegean and Hellas[51].

Plutarch (*Cim*. VI. 4–5), gives as the reason why Pausanias was driven from Byzantium that he had disgraced and murdered Cleonice of Byzantium. Cleonice, of excellent parentage was summoned by Pausanias to his bedroom and her parents, influenced by constraint and fear, abandoned their daughter to her fate. Following the departure of his attendants, Pausanias retired to his bedroom and fell asleep. In the darkness Cleonice silently entered the room and, as she drew near to Pausanias' bed, she accidentally stumbled and upset the lamp holder and Pausanias, awoken by the noise and fearful of assassination, drew his sword and killed the intruder Cleonice with his sword[52]. This is the final episode in Pausanias' dominance over Byzantium. Soon the people and the allies came together under the leadership of Cimon and Aristeides and the Athenians, at the insistence of the people of Byzantium and the allies, took action and drove Pausanias out of Byzantium[53].

According to this relation Plutarch had heard from many people (*Cim*. VI. 4–6; *mor*. VII. 555 *c*: *De Sera Numinis Vindicta* 10; also see Paus. III. 13. 9), after her death, the maiden Cleonice gave Pausanias no peace, coming as a phantom into his sleep at night and scolding him wrathfully. Pausanias endured this harassment by apparition for some time and after his expulsion from Byzantium, he went to the oracle center at Heracleia Pontica where he consulted the oracle and summoned the spirit of Cleonice. He pleaded with her to forgo her wrath and the spirit made a comment pregnant with meaning: "*Soon, on coming to Sparta his troubles would cease*" This was fact a warning of his impending demise[54].

ias, suspected Pausanias' treason and had taken some precautionary measures against his deceptions. Through his clever moves he prevented Pausanias from realizing his objectives, stifling Pausanias' treachery and ensuring the Lacedaimonian general was dismissed and recalled to Sparta for trial.

46 Thuc. I. 128. 3.

47 Thuc. I. 95. 3.

48 Thuc. I. 130. 1.

49 Thuc. I. 131. 1; Corn. Nep. IV. 3. 1 "*Pausanias*". On this subject, see also Westlake 1955, 59; Fornara 1983², 59 nº 61; Loomis 1990, 487 ff.

50 Thuc. I. 95. 4.
According to Plutarch (*Cim*. VI. 3), all of the allies who could no longer endure Pausanias' disdain, arrogance and severity had attached themselves to Cimon and Aristeides. Plutarch also narrates that (*Arist*. XXIII. 5), a group of commanders under the leadership of Ouliades of Samos and Antagoras of Chius rebelled against Pausanias and they joined the Athenians. On this, also see Newskaja 1955, 74 fn. 2; Forrest 1968, 99; Powell 1988, 1.

51 Gomme 1971⁵, 292.

52 According to Plutarch (*mor*. VII. 555 *c*: *De Sera Numinis Vindicta* 10) while in Byzantium, Pausanias felt a strong desire for the maiden Cleonice of Byzantium. Because of his uncontainable lust, he wanted to forcibly seduce the girl, despite Cleonice being free-born, and spend the night with her. But when the maiden drew near, he became suspicious of her and killed her. After that the phantom of Cleonice kept invading his sleep. The phantom said to Pausanias: '*Your day of facing your horrible end determined by your fate draws near; it is evil for men to be arrogant*'. Also on this see Plut. *mor*. VII. 555 *c*: *De Sera Numinis Vindicta* 10 fn. *c*.
From the account presented by Pausanias, the II century A.D. author of the guide book, '*Description of Hellas*' (III. 17. 8), at the time when Pausanias was cruising about the Hellespontus commanding the fleet composed of Lacedaimonian and the allied forces, when he was in Byzantium he saw and he fell in love with Cleonice and that same night, by order of Pausanias, Cleonice was brought to him by his men. When Cleonice was taken into Pausanias' bedroom, he was sound asleep. But he was awaken by the noise the maiden made. This noise was made as the girl was drawing near to the bed upon which Pausanias was lying, she accidentally (was so excited that) she dropped the lamp from her hand. Pausanias, aware that his treasonous dealings with the Persian king were known by the Hellenes and who had consequently become quite nervous and fearful, jumped suddenly out of bed and struck the girl with his sword.

53 Thuc. I. 131. 2; Plut. *Cim*. VI. 5; also see Hdt. VIII. 3. 2.

54 This comment by the oracle concerning the case of Pausanias and Cleonice in Byzantium and the presence of Pausanias in Heracleia Pontica makes Plutarch' narration (*Cim*. VI. 4–6; *mor*. VII. 555 *c*: *De Sera Numinis Vindicta* 10) plausible, as at Cape Acherusia near Heracleia (around Karadeniz Ereğlisi) in antiquity there was an oracular center where messages from the dead-from the spirit world were received. Also, given the close proximity between Byzantium and Heracleia and if Pausanias' state of

According to Iustinus (IX. 1. 3), Pausanias, before his expulsion had held possession of Byzantium for seven years[55]. But this statement is as incorrect as Iustinus' claims (*loc. cit.*) in the same passage that Byzantium was founded by Pausanias[56]. As was clearly expressed in Ephorus (*FGrHist* IIA 70 F 191 lines 37–46), the expulsion of Pausanias from Byzantium was in *ca*. 477/476 B.C. (*Oxyrh. Pap.* XIII. p. 100, 1610 F 6). This was because Cimon, after Byzantium, set sail in *ca*. 476 B.C. towards Eion (Diod. XI. 60. 2 fn. 2; Plut. *Cim*. VII. 1 fn. 1). This chain of events can clearly be traced in Diodorus (XI. 54–60), whose sources were the text of Ephorus and Plutarch (*Cim*. VII. 1 fn. 1). So, Pausanias possibly stayed in Byzantium between *ca*. 478/477 B.C., for a maximum of 7 months[57] (*Oxyrh. Pap.* XIII. p. 100, 1610 F 6).

Pausanias, instead of returning to Sparta after his expulsion from Byzantium, took a ship of Hermione and moved to Colonai[58] in the Troad. When he acted for the second time quite without the consent of the Lacedaimonians, it became impossible not to suspect his designs and in consequence the Lacedaimonians understood he had treacherous dealings with the Persians because this absence otherwise could not be explained and, at last, the Lacedaimonians

mind are taken into consideration, it seems likely that Pausanias visited this oracle center (For more detailed information, see Dörner 1984; 49 ff.; Saprykin 1997, 49; Felton 2002, 24).

And according to Pausanias (III. 17. 9), the commander of the Lacedaimonians did not find it easy to free himself from the spirit of Cleonice of Byzantium. He underwent all sorts of purification and forgiveness rituals in order to purify himself from the sin of the crime he had committed. He even became a suppliant of Zeus (= *phyksios* [φύξιος]), the god of flight. Finally he went to the magicians at the city of Phigalia in Arcadia. He paid the fitting penalty to Cleonice and the god. Then the Lacedaimonians in fulfillment of a divine command from the Apollon oracle center at Delphi erected many bronze statues in order to honor the spirit Bountiful. Because they believed that they had fallen victim to the wrath of Zeus, the god of suppliants due to Pausanias' inappropriate behaviour in Byzantium and consequently the spirit bountiful had abandoned them.

55 This is accepted both by many Turkish and by foreign scholars (also cf. Beloch 1912, II², 1, 185 ff.; 384; Meyer 1899, II 59 f.; Lehmann-Haupt 1921, 59 ff.; Newskaja 1955, 73; Swoboda 1965², *col*. 444; Smart 1967, 137; Oberhummer *et. al*. 1970² *col*. 1130; Lasserre 1979, 569; Demir 2000, 1 ff.), but in terms of the stated length of time, this cannot be correct.

F. Heichelheim (1930, 22–24) claimed that Byzantium minted iron coins while under the rule of Pausanias. He argued that Pausanias wanted to change the Byzantine coin unit into an iron coinage as in Sparta (Poll. *onom*. VII. 105–106; IX. 77–79). Consequently he tries to support Iustinus' false argument of Pausanias' dominance over Byzantium lasting 7 years. But it is impossible for such a commercially reliant and prosperous city such as Byzantium, the most important part of whose earnings came from the merchants, from its port and from the import-export of goods, to be compelled by Pausanias to adopt such an impractical monetary system. Moreover, Pausanias ruled Byzantium like a tyrant, ignoring Spartan traditions, he adopted the Persian way of life, and so it seems somewhat absurd to suppose he forced the population of Byzantium to adopt this unprofitable coinage system. On this, also see White 1964, 144 fn. 19; Gomme 1971⁵, 400.

However, as its commerce and importance increased during the second half of the Vth century B.C., Byzantium began to strike its own coins. Alongside the traditional silver and bronze coinage, iron coins might also have circulated (Newskaja 1955, 51). Aristophanes indicates in his comedy "*The Clouds*" that Byzantium used 'iron coins' (= *sidareoi* [σιδάρεοι]) (Aristoph. *Nub*. 248–249; also see Poll. *onom*. VII. 105–106; IX. 77–79; Hesychius of Alexandria, *lex*. ς. 592 *s.v.* <Σιδάρεος=*Sidareos*>). In addition, he says that the populace of Byzantium swore by iron coins. In the Vth century B.C., in addition to Byzantium and Sparta, iron coins were also employed in Megara, Tegea and Argos. But no iron coins of Byzantium have survived (Head 1977³, 266 f.; Tekin 2005³, 22). However, in the excavations in Tegea and Argos a few coins of this type have been unearthed (Blanchet 1907, 269 ff.). The explanation for the issuance of iron coins in antiquity was financial difficulties, as the circulation of such coins was quite limited and these were commercially valuable only in those cities where there was similar practice. Consequently common silver coinage was also struck in Byzantium for trading with the other cities and countries. Apart from the iron coins, bronze coins were used for small denominations, many examples of which survive (Newskaja 1955, 51 fn. 3).

A. Böckh (1886, 694) has tried to explain this situation as due to the financial difficulties caused by the Byzantium war with the Thracians and then in the Hellenes – Persian Wars, Peloponnesian Wars and the battle against the Macedonian king Philippus II– and in consequence reached the necessity of striking iron coinage. Further the more than 15 *talanta* paid by Byzantium to the Delian Naval League as tax, added to the city's financial burden and it used all of the silver coin for its external trade, in the requirements of war and for *phoros*/*tributum* payment.

56 According to the *Scholia in Demosthenem* (V. 40); Ps.-Skymnus (716); Philostratus (*vit. Soph*. I. 24 [529]); Dionysius of Byzantium (II. 2 *fr.* 10; 7 *fr.* 28); Lydus (*de Mag*. III. 70. 3 fn. *u*); Eusebius (*chron*. 165*h*); Stephanus of Byzantium (*Ethnica s.v.* Βυζάντιον=Byzantion); Eustathius (*Comm. in Dion. Per*. 803), Byzantium was founded by the Megarans. In this sense, the names of the months employed in the 'metropolis' Megara's calendar are compatible with those used in its 'colony' of Byzantium. This similarity is also epigraphically supported through onomastic (the names of persons) evidence. However, according to Ammianus Marcellinus (XXII. 8. 8) Byzantium was a colony of the Atticans; Velleius Paterculus (II. 7. 7) with –Cyzicus of- Miletians; Chronicon Paschale (I. 593), of the Ionians; Konstantinos VII Porphyrogenitus (*de Them*. 'Asia' I. 17. 21–22), of the Dorians; and, according to Iustinus (IX. 1. 3) and Orosius (*hist*. III. 13. 2), a colony of the Spartans. According to Konstantinos (*de Them*. 'Europe' II. 1. 43–45), Byzantium was a colony of the Megarans, Lacedaimonians and Boiotians, the oldest-noblest-ancestors of the Hellenes. The Hellenic dialect spoken in the city was Doric. For more detailed information, see Hdt. IV. 144; Dion. Byz. II. 2 *fr.* 17; 3 *fr.* 18–19=Gyllius *Bosp*. II. 2 *fr.* 17; III. 1 *fr.* 18; *Const*. I. 1; 3; II. 2; Hes. Mil. *Patr. Const*. 3–5; 9; 12; Malal. *chron*. 320–321; Chron. Pasch. I. 493–494; Steph. Byz. *Ethnica s.v.* Βυζάντιον=*Byzantion*; *Etymologicum Magnum* (*s.v.* Βύζαντες=*Byzantes*).

57 Also see Merle 1916, 15 ff.; Meritt *et al.* 1950, 158 f.; 175; 191 ff.; 200; 206 f.; White 1964, 144 f. fn. 19; Hammond 1967, 48 f. fn. 20–21; 1969, 137; Forrest 1968, 99 f.; Gomme 1971⁵, 399 f.; Fornara 1983², 60 f. n° 61 fn. 4; also see Arslan 2009, 57 ff. After the occupation of Byzantium, the Athenian commanders and their allies under the leadership of Pausanias could not have stayed in the city for 7 years and we find no parallel example for this during the Greco-Persian Wars. Further, there was no reason to support the idea that renowned commanders and statesmen, such as Pausanias, Cimon and Aristeides, who played such important roles in Hellenic history, stayed in Byzantium for 7 years.

58 A small town situated to the east of Alexandreia Troas. Its localization is unknown.

decided to take action. They sent a herald to him with a message on a *scytale*[59]. They commanded him to follow the herald. Otherwise, Sparta would declare war on him and so Pausanias was compelled to return to Sparta[60]. According to Thucydides (I. 95. 6–7) the Lacedaimonians sent Dorcis and several men with a smaller military unit as Pausanias's replacement to Byzantium, but, when the allies refused their leadership, Dorcis and the others returned home. After that, the Lacedaimonians stopped sending out commanders fearing the new ones would also be corrupted like Pausanias. As a matter of fact, they wished to end the fight against the Persians as they thought the Athenians could afford to continue the war[61].

After Pausanias left Byzantium and returned to Sparta, he maintained his correspondence with Xerxes and his schemes in favour of the Persians in Hellas. According to Plutarch (*Them*. XXIII. 1–2) when Pausanias came to Hellas, he at first kept his plan hidden from Themistocles. But after the banishment of Themistocles from Athens, when he saw that Themistocles was deeply disappointed, he ventured to offer him a part in this his own undertaking. He showed Themistocles a letter he had received from the Persian king – whether this letter is the one which was sent to Pausanias when he was in Byzantium or was one of the letters which he received while he was in Hellas is today unknown. He incited Themistocles against the Hellenes, saying that they were a base and thankless people. Themistocles rejected Pausanias' offer, absolutely refusing to become involved and he didn't betray Pausanias. He didn't say anything to anyone about Pausanias' treacherous scheme. He thought that Pausanias would give it up of his own accord, or as he was so restless and so full of high aspirations, he would in some other way be found out[62] and subsequent developments showed Themistocles had been

59 *Skytalē* [ἡ σκυτάλη] literally means, 'staff, rod, stick'. It was a secret communication method employed in Sparta between *ephoros,* envoys and generals on an expedition. A leather strip with a message was wrapped around it. This message could only be read by those having a staff posessing the same diameter.

60 Thuc. I. 95. 3; 128. 3; 131. 1–2; Corn. Nep. IV. 2. 2–3 "*Pausanias*"; also see Iust. II. 15. 16.

61 On this, also see Arist. *pol*. V. 7 [1307*a*]; Plut. *Arist*. XXIII. 6.

62 However, according to Plutarch (*Them*. XXIII. 3–4) after Pausanias' conspiracies were discovered and he was put to death, certain letters and documents regarding these matters were discovered, which also cast suspicion upon Themistocles. The Lacedaimonian reaction to this situation was extreme, while Themistocles' Athenian enemies took advantage of it and used it to blame him and, as Themistocles wasn't in Athens, he defended himself through writing letters. Nevertheless, the people preferred to listen to his accusers and it was decreed that men would be sent to arrest him and bring him to stand trial before the congress of the Hellenes. When Themistocles heard this, he

correct in his judgement. The treason of Pausanias was discovered when his ex-favorite and most trustworthy herald from Argyrus, entrusted to deliver the letter to Artabazus, betrayed him[63].

When his treasonous schemes with the Persian king were revealed, Pausanias took refuge in the sacred sanctuary of Athena Chalcioecus in Sparta[64]. While he shut himself in a small structure within the precinct and rested as he wanted to protect himself and avoided being caught, the *ephoros* surrounded the building, removed the roof and imprisoned him there. They waited until Pausanias became exhausted from hunger and thirst and before he perished, he was carried out of the *temenos* wall of the temple and, as soon as he was taken out, he died[65].

hid himself in Hellas for a while and then took refuge with the Persian king as he could never again return to Athens (Plut. *Them*. XXIV. 1–XXXI. 5). On this, also see Forrest 1960, 237.

63 Thuc. I. 132. 1–5; Diod. XI. 45. 1; also see Aristot. *pol*. VII. 13. 13 [1333*b*]. At that time it was learnt that Pausanias was conspiring with the *heilotes* in Sparta. He had promised them freedom and the right of citizenship provided they revolted with him and assisted in all of his undertakings. Although several *heilotes* betrayed Pausanias, the Spartans did nothing. They hesitated to irrevocably punish a Spartan having royal ancestors without rock solid evidence. But Pausanias was finally betrayed by his ex-favorite and most trustworthy herald of Argylus, who was assigned to deliver his letter to the satrap of Dascyleium, Artabazus. The herald, suspecting that the previous heralds had never returned was afraid. Copying the seal of the letter given to him by Pausanias, he opened the letter and, having read it, he saw his suspicions were well-founded. Just as he thought, at the end of the letter it was advised that the messenger shoud be murdered (Thuc. I. 132. 4–5; also see Iust. II. 15. 15). The messenger took the letter to the *ephoroi* and he explained Pausanias' long-term plot. When the *ephoroi* saw the letter, they learnt of Pausanias' conspiracy in all its details, but they also wanted to hear Pausanias' confession from his own mouth. They advised the herald to take refuge as a suppliant in Tenare. When Pausanias learnt that his herald was in Tenare, he went near him and the *ephoroi* listened to their conversation. The herald was saying that he had been sent to the Persian king many times before and he said he had never been unfaithful to his master but Pausanias in his last letter to the king had ordered him to be murdered like any an ordinary servant. Pausanias had to accept the accusations. But again he tried to persuade the herald as he wanted him to deliver the letter –corrected– to Artabazus as soon as possible and not to spoil the undertaking (Thuc. I. 133). The *ephoroi* listened to the whole conversation and they returned to Sparta and they determined to catch Pausanias in the city (Thuc. I. 134. 1). Also see Iust. II. 15. 16–17; Cartledge 2002[2], 183 ff.

64 In antiquity, near some temples there were sacred areas for suppliants. If someone for any reason entered this area and touched the statue of the god, he became protected by the god. Therefore, whatever their crimes were, no one dared to touch or harm them while they were within the sacred sanctuary of the temple and any harm done to people who had entered the sacred confines was regarded as the worst of all crimes and sins, both by the gods and the people. In addition, it was commonly believed that 'divine justice' (= *dikē ek theōn* [δίκη ἐκ θεῶν]) and the 'wrath of gods' (= *mēnima* [μήνιμα]) would later haunt all of those who committed any such acts of wickedness as they would inevitably punish the sinners.

65 Thuc. I. 133. 1–135. 2; Diod. XI. 45. 1–7; Paus. III. 17. 7–9; also see Thuc. I. 138. 6.

In consequence, according to both Ephorus (*FGrHist* II 70 F 191 lines 37–46= *Oxyrh. Pap*. XIII. p. 100, 1610 F 6) and Diodorus of Sicily, who follows the text of Ephorus (XI. 60. 2 fn. 2) and Plutarch (*Cim*. VII. 1 fn. 1), the expulsion of Pausanias from Byzantium by Cimon was in *ca*. 477 B.C. According to Thucydides (I. 96. 1), it was the enmity of the allies against Pausanias which had helped the Athenians to gain control. In other words, Pausanias' conduct and harshness in Byzantium drew Ionia, Hellespontus, the islands and many Greek cities of Hellas to join the Athenians. Then, with Aristeides in the lead, they formed a confederation similar to the Peloponnesian League, formed in the Peleponnesus by the Lacedaimonians. In *ca*. 478/477, they laid the foundations of their own naval alliance which united them (*The Delian League*) against the Persians. The aim of the Delian League was to exact revenge on the Persians, who had inflicted much harm on them, by destroying the lands of the Persian king[66]. In addition, they aimed to be prepared against any possible Persian campaign against them and to resist as a whole body[67]. The first thing they did was to clean the Hellespontus, the coasts of Marmara and the Bosporus of the Persians, in order to keep the Black Sea trading route open. In this respect, it seems the cities of Byzantium and Chalcedon also joined the Delian League, established *ca*. 477 B.C. by the Athenians against the Persians and so from that date onward, they began to pay 'tribute' (= *phoros* [φόρος]/*tributum*) regularly to the league[68].

Moreover, Cimon, after Byzantium, sailed out with the fleet of the allies of the Delian League towards Eion in *ca*. 476 B.C. According to the *Scholia in Aeschinem* (II. 31), εἰληφότες Ἠϊόνα, ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Φαίδωνος= *while Phaidon was an archon*[69] *in Athens*, *they captured Eion*[70]. Phaidon was the *archon* in Athens in 476 B.C.[71]. Therefore, as has earlier been pointed out, contrary to Iustinus' claim (IX. 1. 3), it is chronologically incorrect to think Pausanias ruled over Byzantium for 7 years. It could be for a maximum period of 7 months in *ca*. 477/476 B.C.

66 Thuc. I. 96. 1; Diod. XI. 47. 1; Plut. *Arist*. XXIV. 1.

67 Diod. XI. 60. 5–6; Plut. *Cim*. XII. 1–5. On this, see also Keen 1998, 99 fn. 16; Arslan 2008, 50.

68 Thuc. I. 96. 2. On this see also Meritt *et al.* 1939, 156 ff.; 1950, 158 f.; 175; 191 ff.; 200; 206 f. fn. 55.

69 The name of the high government official elected to rule the city of Athens for one year. Every year 9 persons were chosen to hold this office.

70 Thuc. I. 98. For more detailed information, see also: Hammond 1969, 137; Meritt *et al*. 1950, 158 ff.

71 Samuel 1972, 206; Bickerman 1980², 138 *table* IV.

Inner Conflicts in Byzantium (403 B.C.): Clearchus' Seizures and His Tyrannical Regime in Byzantium

From Diodorus (XIV. p. I. 12; 12. 2), we learn that in 403 B.C. Byzantium experienced troubles with the neighboring Thracians. Byzantium also began to experience serious difficulties due to internal strife and political conflicts and the population was unable to resolve these problems by themselves. The councillors fearing that the situation would result in a civil war had to turn to Sparta for help. They asked the Spartans to dispatch a general to deal with the domestic struggles and the Spartans decided to send, as they had done 7 years before, Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, who had friendly relations with the population of Byzantium[72].

According to Polyainus (*strat*. II. 2. 7 "*Clearchus*"), Clearchus put out to sea with a fleet of 4 ships under his command from the Peloponnesus on a mission to quell the domestic conflicts in Byzantium and to restore peace and security to the city. When he came to Lampsacus at the Çanakkale Straits, he lay at anchor in the city's port. Clearchus made his arrival at the Çanakkale Strait known in Byzantium by the forces under his command, but, for some reason he didn't immediately sail to Byzantium[73]. During his stay in Lampsacus, he spent most of his time living comfortably and extravagantly in Lampsacus while making plans for taking Byzantium under his control. The population of Byzantium experienced difficult times due to both the factional strife and from the constant pressure from the Thracians and so they decided to consult Clearchus, the official guest of their city, sending a group of envoys to Lampsacus. Although the envoys from Byzantium came to Lampsacus, Clearchus didn't agree to meet them for the first three days, using the excuse that he was suffering badly from gout. On the fourth day, after listening to what the envoys related, he said that he felt really sorry for the recent happenings in their city and he assured them that he would soon give the assistance the Byzantium envoys requested of him. And equipping two more vessels he had acquired from the port of Lampsacus, he immediately set sail with 6 ships towards Byzantium[74]. After he lay at anchor off Byzantium, he entered the city with his soldiers and he spoke in the Byzantium assembly. In his speech, he advised the Byzantians to assault the Thracians simultaneously, both from behind and from the city in order to remove their pressure upon the city and to distract the enemy. He persuaded the cavalry and the light infantry of Byzantium to embark on ships

72 Smith 1948, 146.

73 Polyain. *strat*. II. 2. 7 "*Clearchus*".

74 Polyain. *strat*. II. 2. 7 "*Clearchus*".

to attack the Thracians from behind. Also he ordered the captains of the ships, as soon as he had signalled from the city, to pull up the anchors and set sail towards the Çanakkale Straits. When the Byzantium forces embarked on the ships, with the war signal Clearchus had given, the fleet raised anchors. Clearchus remained in the city with his military units, feigned he was thirsty while the commanders of the forces of Byzantium were with him and suggested they go together to a nearby tavern and quench thirst together. After his men had taken up position at the entrance of the tavern, he had the generals murdered in the tavern and the tavern owner's silence was bought with the threat of death. Then, in the absence of most of the military forces of Byzantium he proceeded to declare himself the governor/*harmostes* of the city[75].

According to Diodorus (XIV. 12. 2), when Clearchus came to Byzantium to bring order and solve the problems of the city, he was given the utmost authority. Clearchus raised significant numbers of mercenaries under his command to fight against the Thracians. He started to treat the people of Byzantium as if he was a 'tyrant' (= *tyrannos* [τύραννος]) rather than their protector/ruler. First, he invited the holders of the key administrative positions in Byzantium to celebrate a festival[76] together and put those who participated to the sword. Having rapidly rid Byzantium of its high administrative officials, he arrested 30 prominent citizens and had them executed and then seized the properties of those who had been killed. He continued to abuse his authority through inventing pretexts to possess the riches of those of the citizens who were noteworthy for their wealth and high incomes. He devised various accusations against the rich. Some of them were killed and some were banished on the basis of accusations, sometimes serious, when he could find one, and sometimes only for some trifle, when he couldn't find anything more serious. Employing his newly acquired wealth to hire mercenaries, he increased the size of his mercenary corps and thereby secured his absolute dominance over Byzantium. When, declaring himself tyrant of Byzantium, he began to rule the city badly and cruelly[77].

However, on the other hand, although Clearchus had been warned by the Spartan *ephoroi* not to launch an expedition against the Thracians[78], he protected the people of Byzantium against Thracian assaults and successfully fought against the Thracians[79] and defended Byzantium territorium with the forces under his command[80] against the Thracian raids and even marched into Thrace and fought with some Thracian tribes and obtained a considerable quantity of trophies. In the course of one of these expeditions, when he was returning with his trophies to Byzantium, he had to camp in the Thracian Mountains. Thinking that the Thracians would raid his camps as soon as night fell, he rested his troops and alerted his corps for a possible night raid and, in order to test his soldiers, he himself staged a fake raid against his own camp with several horsemen, using Thracian war tactics. His soldiers, thinking that they were being attacked by the enemy immediately took up fighting position against the raiders. A little later, another but this time a real raid was launched by the Thracians, who had planned to catch Clearchus and his forces off guard with a night attack. However, entirely contrary to their expectations, they faced and were severely mauled and defeated by this strong and alert fighting force and the Thracian raiders had to retreat[81], and in consequence Clearchus returned to Byzantium as a victorious commander.

75 Polyain. *strat*. II. 2. 7 "*Clearchus*". The date of composition of Polyainus' narration of the capture of Byzantium by Clearchus isn't certain, but this event was also reported by Diodorus (XIV. 12. 2–3) in quite a similar way. Consequently, 403 B.C. seems to be the most appropriate date for Clearchus' arrival and taking control over the city of Byzantium. This date because, according to Thucydides (VIII. 80), the revolt of Byzantium against the Athenians in 412 B.C. was organized by the Helixus of Megara. And according to Xenophon (*Hell*. I. 1. 36), in *ca*. 410/409 B.C., Clearchus came to Byzantium with a fleet of 12 ships under his command and in the same year successfully defended the city, at least for a short period of time, against the Athenians commanded by Alcibiades and their allies who had surrounded the city by both land and sea.

76 Which god-goddess this festival was dedicated to and how it was celebrated is not known. However, among the festivals held in Byzantium, the Dionysia festivals with their characteristic theatrical presentations (for the honorification of Asclepiades from Byzantium by the Athenians, also see *IG* II 251 [= *IG* II^2 555]) and 'Bosporia'[Βοσπόρια], which was a specific Byzantium festival and which included 'the torch race' [τᾷ λαμπάδι τῶν ἀνήβων] are known. A contestant named Olympiodorus, who was the winner of such a contest, was honoured with a gold crown which he didn't keep but dedicated his prize to Hermes and Heracles (Dethier-Mordtmann 1864, n° 13; Fıratlı 1964, 154; *I.Byzantion* 39 f. n° 11 lines. 1–6). The festival during the gymnastic contests was celebrated by the population of Byzantium as well as by all the other Hellenes. Apparently there were many *gymnasion* and *stadion* in Byzantium (Xen. *Anab*. VII. 1. 21–30; Aristot. *Oecon*. II. 2. 3*a* [1346*b*]; Dion. Byz. II. 2 *fr*. 8–10; also see Hes. Mil. *Patr. Const*. 15; Gyllius *Bosp*. II. 2; *Const*. II. 24). In addition to the ancient sources, an inscription dating from the Archaic Period of the *stadion* runner in Byzantium has been discovered (*I.Byzantion* 77 n° 42 line. 3). Apart from these, the contestants from Byzantium who participated in the Olympic Games in antiquity are known, but none succeeded in receiving the title of Olympic winner (Förster 1891–1892). On this, see also, Newskaja 1955, 162.

77 Diod. XIV. *p*1. 11; 12. 3.

78 From this expression in Polyainus' (*strat*. II. 2. 7 "*Clearchus*") passage, it must be understood that Clearchus was sent to Byzantium primarily in order to defend the city against the Thracian raids, rather than to lead an expedition against them.

79 Polyain. *strat*. II. 2. 6 "*Clearchus*".

80 At that time the Byzantium corps were probably defending the city itself together with Clearchus' mercenaries.

81 Polyain. *strat*. II. 2. 6 "*Clearchus*".

However, the Spartans finally obtained news of Clearchus' cruelty and of the tyrannical regime which he had established in Byzantium. In consequence of the insistence of many from Byzantium who repeatedly complained about the situation, the Lacedaimonians sent a group of envoys to Clearchus. They ordered him to put an end to his tyrannical conduct in Byzantium and to return to Sparta immediately, but Clearchus ignored their commands. So he was punished for his disobediance and was sentenced to death by the highest official authority of Sparta, the *ephoroi* and, in addition, they sent a fully-equipped army commanded by Panthoidas to rescue Byzantium from the tyranny of Clearchus[82]. When Clearchus heard that Panthoidas was marching against Byzantium, he didn't want to stay in the city as he didn't want to risk being besieged by the Lacedaimonians in a city where numbers of the population had hostile feelings towards him due to his cruelty and the crimes he had committed against members of the population of Byzantium. If he had stayed, he would have been trapped between the Lacedaimonians outside and the hostile inhabitants of Byzantium inside the city. Taking all his treasure with him, he deserted Byzantium, first marching against Selymbria where through a surprise raid he captured the city[83]. When he heard that the Lacedaimonian army was approaching, he advanced against them with all his forces and he met Panthoidas' corps at a place called Porus but, after a hard fought battle, the Lacedaimonian troops fighting bravely defeated the forces of the tyrant and Clearchus, with his remaining forces, retreated to Selymbria. At Selymbria surrounded by Panthoidas's troops in an apparently hopeless situation, he slipped secretly away at night and fled to Ionia. In exile Clearchus took refuge with Cyrus, who was planning to revolt against his brother, the Persian king Artaxerxes Mnemon II, and they soon became friends[84]. During this time, Byzantium was saved with the ending of Clearchus's tyrannical by Panthoidas and the city again became independent and continued to be ruled by the aristocracy. A Spartan *harmostes* was appointed and so the freedom which had been taken from the population by one Spartan general was returned to them by another[85].

82 Diod. XIV. 12. 4.

83 Diod. XIV. 12. 5–6.

84 Diod. XIV. 12. 6–7; also see Xen. *Anab*. I. 1. 9; II. 6. 4; cf. Plut. *Artax*. VI. 3–4.

85 In reality, the 'freedom/independence' (= *autonomia* [αὐτονομία]) of Byzantium at that time was quite relative, as, like many Greek cities in Asia Minor, Byzantium had a Lacedaimonian *harmostes*/governor and was under pro-Spartan aristocratic rule.

Thrasybulus' Byzantium-Chalcedon Campaign (ca. 389 B.C.) and the Peace of Antalcidas (387 B.C.):

Byzantium ruled by an oligarchy remained allied to the Lacedaimonians from 399 until 389 B.C. and in this period a Lacedaimonian garrison continued to garrison the city in order to maintain both the regime and the city's security[86]. The Spartan *harmostes* played an important role in the rule of Byzantium and establishing the security and defence of the city a Spartan admiral also held office. But the victory of the Persian fleet commanded by Pharnabazus and Conon over the Lacedaimonians in the naval engagement off Cnidus in August 394 B.C.[87] resulted in some Greek islands and city states revolting against Sparta. Then, Conon and Pharnabazus initially cruised through the Cyclades (Aegean) and along the coastline of Asia Minor and began to expel the Spartan *harmosts* from the cities. This eventually led to the separation of those cities allied with Lacedaimonia from the league[88]. While Conon and Pharnabazus were doing this, they gave assurances that they wouldn't fortify the citadels of the cities, nor would they station any garrisons there and that they would respect the autonomous status of these cities[89]. The citizens were overjoyed and hailed Pharnabazus and Conon as saviours. They removed the Spartan garrisons and *harmosts* from their cities[90] and declared their independence[91]. Following which the Lacedaimonians lost their control over Europe, Asia Minor, the islands and the Çanakkale Straits. However, as a result of the personal efforts of the

86 The garrison in question was stationed here during the second half of the Peloponnessian Wars, after Byzantium broke its allience with the Athenians, in 412 B.C. and especially after the Aigos potamoi naval battle of 405 B.C. by the Spartans –Lysandrus– (Xen. *Hell*. II. 2. 1–2; Plut. *Lys*. XIII. 3–4). On this, also see Xen. *Anab*. VI. 6. 9; 13.

87 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 3. 10–14; 8. 1.

88 During that time, the anti-Lacedaimonian parties and citizens in Byzantium and Chalcedon must have acted in order to change the pro-Spartan oligarchic regime and restore their earlier democratic rule from what we learn from Xenophon (*Anab*. VII. 1. 39), in Byzantium from 399 B.C. onward, the citizens were divided into factions who were hostile to each other.

89 According to Xenophon (*Hell*. IV. 8. 2), it was Conon who gave these instructions to Pharnabazus. Conon told the Persian satrap that if he acted thus, all the cities would be friendly to him. However if he showed any intention of enslaving them, he would have to engage in battles with each city in turn to seize them; and that if the cities became aware of his intentions, he would even find himself face to face with the Hellenes united against him.

90 The cities not only wanted their freedom and autonomy, but also homelands without garrisons. Because the rights of the city-states were; freedom [ἐλευθερία], independence [αὐτονομία], autarchy [αὐτάρκεια]; being exempt from garrisons [ἀφρούρητος] and from regularly paying taxes [ἀφορολόγητος/ἀτέλεια].

91 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 2. The city of Erythrai also issued a decree concerning Conon (*SIG*^{3} 126).

Spartan general Dercylidas, the cities of Abydus and Sestus remained attached to the Lacedaimonians and the Lacedaimonian *harmosts* who had been expelled from Asia Minor and the islands gathered in Abydus. Then, Dercylidas crossed from Abydus across the narrowest part of the Çanakkale Straits –a distance of about 8 *stadia*– to Sestus. He succeeded in collecting at Sestus the influential people who held lands in Chersonesus due to the Lacedaimonians and all of the *harmosts* who had been driven out of the European cities[92].

In the autumn of 394 B.C., Pharnabazus disembarked at Ephesus and gave Conon 40 *triereis*. He wanted to meet him off Abydus in order to expel the Lacedaimonians stationed at Sestus and Abydus. He set off by land to go to his province. Because he thought that if he managed to break the resistance of the Lacedaimonians at this strategic point, at first Byzantium and Chalcedon and then all the cities of Marmara would be easily detached from their Spartan alliance. Consequently, a short time later he met Conon off Abydus and after ravaging the city's territorium, together they besieged Abydus. But since the weather was getting colder, the winter making itself felt and the city was strongly defended, they failed in their attempt to conquer it[93]. They spent the winter months rectifying the shortcomings in their armies and fleets with Pharnabazus fully manning many vessels and he raised an army, mostly of mercenaries. But in 393 B.C. he gave up on his plans to take Abydus and Sestus and they sailed towards the island of Cythera and directly attacked Lacedaimonia[94].

In 391 B.C., the Rhodian oligarchs who had been expelled from their island by pro-democratic citizens came to Sparta and they insisted that if the Athenians subdued Rhodes, the Lacedaimonians would find themselves in a difficult position. If the democratic party maintained its hold on administrative power, the island of Rhodes would certainly fall into the hands of the Athenians. They emphasized the importance of this situation for the Spartans[95]. The Rhodian envoys asked for

92 Xenophon's narration (*Hell*. IV. 8. 1–5) does not record which cities in Europe, the islands, Asia Minor and along the Straits of Çanakkale revolted against the Lacedaimonians, but as far as it can be understood from the text, the number of cities in this revolt must have been high.

93 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 3; 6–7.

94 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 7–8. Thus, Conon returned to Athens in 393 B.C. With the support and financial aid of Pharnabazus, he rebuilt the long walls of Athens and most of the fortifications around the port of Piraeus (Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 9–10). In fact, the Athenians had started the construction of the long walls in 394 B.C. (*IG* II^2 1656).

95 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 20. However, according to Diodorus (XIV. 79. 6), when Conon set sail towards Chersonesus with the Persian fleet under his command in 396 B.C., the Rhodians drove the Lacedaimonian fleet out of their harbour, revolted against Sparta and met with Conon's fleet.

Spartan assistance to restore their power on the island and, in consequence, the Spartans manned a fleet of 8 ships given to the command of Ecdicus with the task of putting an end to the regime in Rhodes and bringing the Rhodian oligarchs to power. Although Ecdicus reached Cnidus, when he saw that the Rhodians had superiority on both sea and land, he did not accomplish his mission, and consequently the Spartans recalled him in 390 B.C. and Teleutias took over command from Ecdicus[96]. Teleutias with a fleet of 12 vessels under his command first set sail for Samos. He obtained from there 7 *triereis* and sailed on to Cnidus and lay at anchor off the port. Here, after adding 7 more vessels from Ecdicus' fleet to his own, he continued his voyage to Rhodes and besieged the island[97].

The Athenians, believing that the Spartans were laying the basis of a new naval supremacy, responded by sending out in 389 B.C. Thrasybulus of Steiria, in command of a fleet of 40 vessels to assist Rhodes. But Thrasybulus thought that at that time it was needless to sail directly to Rhodes. There were two principal reasons for this line of thought. Firstly, he knew that it would not be easy to defeat the Spartan army and its allies on the island as they were stationed in a really strongly fortified location. Secondly, the possibility of the pro-Athenian democratic forces, who held the cities in Rhodes, being defeated by the enemy was very slight, as, in addition to their cities' being so well-fortified, they numerically outnumbered the enemy. Moreover, they had recently gained a victory. Therefore, Thrasybulus attached Thasus (Taşöz) to the Athenians, thinking that this would be more in line with the interests of the Athenians[98]. Then he sailed to the Çanakkale Straits. The first thing he did was to reconcile Amedocus, the king of Odrys[99] and Seuthes, the ruler of the Thracian coastal region to each other, after he had learnt they were not on friendly terms and he made them friends. Then he made Amedocus and Seuthes the allies of Athens[100]. He thought the alliance of

96 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 20; 22–23.

97 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 23–24.

98 Dem. *Lept*. XX. 59 [474–475].

99 Xenophon (*Anab*. VII. 2. 32; 3. 16–17) and Diodorus (XIII. 105. 3; XIV. 94. 2) record the name of this Thracian king as Medocus, as on the coins, the name of the king was inscribed as Medocus. For the relation between Seuthes and Odrys, see also Xen. *Hell*. III. 3. 2; IV. 8. 26. For more detailed information, see Archibald 1998, 122 fn. 136.

100 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 26; also see Lysias XXVIII. 5–6 [180]; Diod. XIV. 94. 2. As the Odrysians ruled inland Thrace – to a distance of 12-day walking from the coast (Xen. *Anab*. VII. 3. 16)– and Seuthes, the ruler of coastal Thrace was previously allied with the Lacedaimonians (Xen. *Hell*. III. 3. 2). It is observed that this alliance realised by Thrasybulus had a positive impact upon the Greek cities of Asia Minor. After this agreement, some Greek cities adopted more friendly relations with the

these two Thracian kings to Athens would improve the relations of the Athenians with the cities on the Thracian coast, along the Hellespont and Byzantium and Chalcedon. Since the Persian king, Artaxerxes II was on friendly terms with the Athenians, they had no problem with the cities of Asia Minor. Thrasybulus set sail for Byzantium and lay at anchor at the exit of Bosporus. He began to impose a tithe upon the trading ships sailing from the Black Sea and, with the assistance of certain people from Byzantium led by Archebius and Heracleides, he removed Byzantium from Lacedaimonian control, ending the Spartan oligarchic regime in the city, restoring democracy to the city. Archebius and Heracleides of Byzantium not only delivered Byzantium to Thrasybulus but also assisted him in establishing Athenean supremacy over the Çanakkale Straits[101]. The result of this was that the demos of Byzantium warmly welcomed the Athenians in their city. This was because while Byzantium was under Spartan rule, many of the citizens who had been exiled had taken refuge in Athens[102] and now they returned to their city. Having succeeded in Byzantium, Thrasybulus sailed to Chalcedon with his fleet and made the people of Chalcedon friends with the Athenians, then he left for the Marmara Sea[103]. In battle he fought the Spartan *harmostes*, Therimachus in

Athenians. But whether their attitude resulted from the harshness of the Spartan *harmosts*; from the friendly conduct of Thrasybulus or from the influence of the Odrysian Kingdom on these cities, or some combination of these factors is uncertain. For more detailed information, see Archibald 1998, 124 f.

101 Dem. *Lept*. XX. 60–61 [475]; Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 27; also see Lysias XXVIII. 6 [180]. When Thrasybulus launched an expedition to the Çanakkale Straits, some Athenians, claimed he was in fact appointed as the admiral only to assist Rhodes, and they complained about his diverting from the original aim of the campaign (Lysias XXVIII. 5 [180]); for more detailed information, see Merle 1916, 36 f.; Cawkwell 1963, 153; Shuckburgh 1967, 332 f.; Perlman 1968, 264; Strauss 1984, 46 f.

102 Because, at that time many citizens of Byzantium were living as exiles in Athens. Also see Dem. *Apat*. XXXIII. 5 ff. [894].

103 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 27–28. It seems unreasonable to think that in 389 B.C. the Lacedaimonians left such vitally important cities as Byzantium and Chalcedon, key points on the İstanbul Straits and Black Sea trade routes, undefended and ungarrisoned. However, in Xenophon's (*Hell*. IV. 8. 27–28) passages, there is nothing to indicate that any kind of sanctions were imposed by Thrasybulus, nor that there were outbreaks of conflict when he came to Byzantium, where he converted the oligarchic regime and when he secured friendship between the people of Chalcedon and the Athenians. This suggests to us that during this period, there were no Lacedaimonian garrisons and Spartan *harmosts* in either Byzantium or Chalcedon. As it seems evident that if there had been Spartan *harmosts* in these cities it would have been impossible to capture them without fighting, nor would it have been possible to end the oligarchic regime while the governors were present. Therefore, this expression of Xenophon naturally raises the possibility that, after the Cnidus sea battle in 394 B.C., the *harmosts* of Byzantium and Chalcedon responded to the call from the Spartan commander, Dercylidas, and they had in consequence joined forces at Sestus with those governors who had been driven out of the European cities (also see Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 5).

On the other hand, according to Demosthenes (*Lept*. XX. 59–60 [474–475]), Thrasybulus captured Byzantium, just as was the case with the island of Thasus, through the help of some of the citizens of the city. Ecphantus, who was his supporter at Thasus, delivered the city up to Thrasybulus after he had sent away the Lacedaimonian garrison in the city. In that case, Archebius and Heracleides of Byzantium, who delivered Byzantium to Thrasybulus and contributed to the establishment of Athenian supremacy over the Çanakkale Straits, must have played an important role in the removal of the Lacedaimonian garrisons from Byzantium and Chalcedon and also because both Archebius of Byzantium and Ecphantus, were later rewarded by the Athenians (*Lept*. XX. 61–63 [475–476]). On Archebius' friendship with the Athenians, see also: Dem. *Arist*. XXIII. 189 [683–684]

104 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 28–30; Diod. XIV. 94. 3–4.

105 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 30–31; also see Lysias XXVIII. 8 [180]; Corn. Nep. VIII. 4. 3 "*Thrasybulus*".

106 Dem. *Lept*. XX. 60 [475]; Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 31.

107 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 31–33. Also see Rhodes–Osborne 2007, 80 f.

Mytilene and killed him. As a result of this victory, the island of Lesbos became an ally of Athens. Many cities of the Cyclades and on the coastline of Asia Minor responded in the same way and likewise became allied to Athens. In 388 B.C. Thrasybulus proceeded to Rhodes where he made his army and fleet as powerful as was possible[104]. Then his fleet set sail for Pamphylia and moored in the mouth of the Eurymedon (Köprüçay). He collected the tax from the Aspendians. But when his soldiers provoked an incident, the Aspendians burst into his headquarters at night and killed him in his tent[105].

The Lacedaimonians noticed that the Athenians had made Byzantium their base and that they were levying a tax of 10% on the goods of the ships sailing from the Black Sea and they retained their hold over Chalcedon as the Athenians had begun to obtain considerable revenue[106] and, in addition, the Athenians were on friendly terms with Pharnabazus and consequently developed friendly relationships with the cities along the Çanakkale Straits and around the Marmara Sea, which prompted the Lacedaimonians to act. They felt it necessary to take precautions and Dercylidas through no fault of his own was replaced and in 388 B.C., the Lacedaimonians appointed Anacsibius the *harmostes* of Abydus, the former naval commander of Byzantium, who had won the friendship of the *ephoroi*. They granted him 3 *triereis* and funds to support 1.000 mercenaries and sent him to the Çanakkale Straits[107] as they believed they would be able to turn events in their favour in the Çanakkale Straits, Byzantium and Chalcedon. When Anacsibius reached the region, he attempted through force to separate the cities of Aiolis from Pharnabazus. He ravaged the territory of Abydus and then the Athenians, fearing

that the results of Thrasybulus' work in the Hellespontus and in Byzantium and Chalcedon might be ruined, sent Iphicrates. Iphicrates arrived at the Çanakkale Straits with a fleet of 8 ships and about 1.200 lightly armed soldiers and he ambushed Anacsibius while he was on his way from Antandrus to Abydus. During this fight, Iphicrates killed Anacsibius along with 12 Spartan *harmosts*, who had come from their cities and had gathered in Abydus. The Lacedaimonian casualties in this battle were about 1,200 men from various units and those who managed to flee were pursued by Iphicrates' soldiers as far as Abydus. After that, Iphicrates first went to Chersonesus[108] and then to Chalcedon and Byzantium[109].

In 387 B.C., the Spartan king Antalcidas, who had formed an alliance with the Persian king, Artaxerxes II[110], returned to Asia Minor with Tiribazus, who was held in high honour.When he heard of the defeat in the territorium of Abydus and that Nicolochus, the Spartan *harmostes* in the city, was with his ships being blockaded by Iphicrates and Diotimus, he set out immediately overland for Abydus[111]. Iphicrates, after leaving a sufficient number from the fleets and military units behind, with Demainetus, Dionysius, Leontichus and Phanias in command, in order to check the moves of Antalcidas, set sail for Byzantium. Later he blockaded Chalcedon, which at the insistence of Thrasybulus had accepted the friendship of the Athenians in 388 B.C. but which now supported the Lacedaimonians. Antalcidas, who was in Abydus at that time, spread the word that he was called to their help by the people of Chalcedon and at night he put out to sea with his fleet[112]. Although he was sailing for Chalcedon, when he reached Percote[113], secretly he set his ships at anchor. When Demainetus, Dionysius, Leontichus and Phanias heard that Antalcidas was sailing towards the İstanbul Straits, they took immediate action and sailed to Proconnesus. But Antalcidas with his fleet moored in concealment at Percote, waited until they had sailed past him towards Byzantium, and then he returned to Abydus as he was expecting the arrival of a fleet of 20 ships, sent by Syracusai and the allies in Italy, who were to meet

108 Xen. *Hell*. IV. 8. 34–39.

109 Polyain. *strat*. II. 24 "*Antalcidas*".

110 Xen. *Hell*. V. 1. 25. According to Xenophon (*Hell*. IV. 8. 14), the principal article of this treaty concerned the independence of all the coastal Greek cities and of the islands of Asia Minor.

111 Xen. *Hell*. V. 1. 25.

112 Xen. *Hell*. V. 1. 25; Polyain. *strat*. II. 24 "*Antalcidas*".

113 Percote, which is an ancient town of the Troas, is located on the sloping hill of Erdağ, 10 km. to the east of Umurbey. The new Percote is thought to have been situated on the north bank of the river Practius (Umurbey) flowing through Gökköy, about 6 km. to the northeast of Umurbey.

him at Abydus. While he was in Abydus, he learnt that Thrasybulus of Collytus had sailed from Thrace with a fleet composed of 8 ships to join the Athenian fleet stationed at Byzantium and commanded by Iphicrates. When his scouts signalled to him that the enemy fleet of 8 ships which set sail towards the Çanakkale Strait for Byzantium was approaching, Antalcidas embarked sailors in 12 of his fastest *triereis* and lay in wait for the Athenians. After the Athenian fleet sailed past, he pursued them. When the Athenians noticed that they were being followed, they started to flee towards Byzantium, but he quickly overhauled the slowest, heavy enemy ships while, with the foremost ships of his fleet he continued in pursuit of those which were ahead. When he captured them, those who were behind them saw that the leaders of their fleet were taken and they consequently lost heart and surrendered to the Spartans. Thus, all the ships under the command of Thrasybulus of Collytus sailing to Byzantium to provide assistance to Iphicrates were captured by Antalcidas[114].

When Antalcidas returned to Abydus, he added to his fleet the 20 ships which came from Syracusai. Also, the ships sent from the Ionian Region, where Ariobarzanes succeeded Pharnabazus as the satrap of Dascyleium, also joined his fleet there. Thus, in 387 B.C. Antalcidas became the master of the Çanakkale Straits with a fleet of more than 80 ships. At that time, the Athenian fleet commanded by Iphicrates had lain at anchor off Byzantium and although the Athenians controlled the Black Sea trade through the İstanbul Strait, the fact that the Çanakkale Strait was under Spartan rule posed difficulties, as Antalcidas, who was stationed with his fleet in the Çanakkale Strait began to prevent merchant ships from sailing from the Black Sea to Athens and compelled them instead to sail to the ports of his allies[115]. As a result, Athens experienced food shortages and the price of grain increased in the city[116].

114 Xen. *Hell*. V. 1. 27. According to Polyainus (*strat*. II. 24 "*Antalcidas*"), since Antalcidas' strong fleet was stationed at Abydus, the Athenian fleet assigned with the task of assisting Iphicrates, who was then in Byzantium and was busy besieging Chalcedon, lay at anchor at Tenedus (Bozcaada). When Antalcidas heard that his allies in Chalcedon were being attacked by the Athenians under the command of Iphicrates, he set sail from Abydos to help them. But as he sailed near Cyzicus, he lay in wait in for the Athenians in a bay where he could best conceal his ships. At that time the Athenians, who were observing his moves on the island of Tenedus set sail for the Çanakkale Straits to meet Iphicrates at Byzantium as soon as possible. But they didn't notice the fleet that Antalcidas had concealed in the bay. When they approached the bay, Antalcidas unexpectedly launched a strong attack against the Athenian fleet and he sank some and captured other vessels of the fleet.

115 Xen. *Hell*. V. 1. 28.

116 Lysias XXII. 14–15 [165].

Since the Lacedaimonians had made an alliance with the Persian king, the Athenians began to fear that they might be beaten, as they had already been heavily defeated at Aigos Potamoi. For these reasons, when Tiribazus ordered those who wanted to hear the peace conditions of the Persian king to be present, the Athenians, like all the other city-states sent their envoys to the Persian high official[117]. Then, in 387 B.C., they signed '*The Peace of Antalcidas*'. The terms of this treaty were as follows:

- The cities in Asia and the islands of Clazomenai[118] (Urla) *and Cyprus should belong to the Persian king, Artaxerxes II;*

- The other Greek cities and islands, both small and big, should be recognized as free and independent[119]*;*

- Only Lemnus, Imbrus and Scyrus should remain, as of old, under the control of the Athenians;

And the treaty was signed by Artaxerxes II Mnemon and the Hellenes. Whichever of the parties broke the treaty's terms, the Persian king as the guarantor of the treaty would make war against them both by land and by sea, utilising both his ships and his wealth in company with those who followed the terms of this treaty[120].

In accordance with the terms of this treaty, in 387 B.C., Byzantium and Chalcedon, like the other Greek cities and islands, expelled the garrisons from their cities and consequently, while Byzantium was granted autonomy and self-government, Chalcedon came under Persian rule[121].

At this time we find Byzantium struck silver coins as a member of an alliance that was formed in Western Anatolia in the first quarter of the IVth century B.C.[122] The

117 Xen. *Hell*. V. 1. 29–30.

118 The Persian king thought it right to attach this island to himself as Clazomenai was experiencing a period of political crisis (*IG* II^2 1. 28).

119 The term relating to autonomy was of crucial importance, both for the Persian king and for the Spartans, as it constituted a major hiderance to Athens re-establishing a hegemonic organization.

120 Xen. *Hell*. V. 1. 31; Diod. XIV. 110. 2–3; XV. 5. 1; Plut. *Artax*. XXI. 5; Isok. *Paneg*. IV. 115; also see Dem. *Rhod*. XV. 29 [199]; *Lept*. XX. 60 [475] fn. *a*; Isok. *de Pac.* 16 [162] fn. *d*; Polyb. IV. 27. 5.

121 Avram 2004, 980 n^o 743.

122 When this league was formed and when exactly Byzantium became a member of it remains unclear. Some claim the league might have been established in the last quarter of the Vth century B.C. (also see Tekin 2005^3, 24 f.). But the fact that the island of Samos was the chief ally of the Athenians in the last quarter of the Vth century B.C. (Thuc. VIII. 16; 19; 21; 27; 30; 33; 35; 38; 43–44; 47–54; 56; also Xen. *Hell*. II. 2. 1–2; 5–6; Plut. *Lys*. VI. 2; XIII. 3–4; XIV. 1), makes it impossible for the island to have been a member of this league at this time. From this, it seems probable that the league was founded in the first quarter of the IVth century B.C., with the support of the Persian king and the Athenians against the Lacedaimonians; either after the Cnidus Naval Battle in 394 B.C., or after the Peace of Antalcidas in 387 B.C.. On this, see also Diod. XV. 5. 1–3; 28. 2–4.

ancient sources and epigraphical documents provide us with no information about this alliance, the only evidence comes from numismatic finds.[123] It seems, as far as can be understood, that the other member cities of this alliance were: Cyzicus, Ephesus, Samos, Cnidus, Rhodes, Iasus and perhaps Lampsacus[124]. On the obverse of the coins of the 'League' (= *symmakhia*), minted in accord with the Persian system of weights[125] is a depiction of the child Heracles wrestling with the snakes and the abbreviation *SYN* [ΣΥΝ][126]. Each city placed its own emblem on the reverse, and consequently, Byzantium again employed the type depicting a cow standing on a dolphin[127]. The date of issuance of these coins is generally elucidated from the choice of the type of Heracles depicted on the obverse. Some argue that this league was established towards the end of the Peloponnessian Wars by Sparta as an anti-Athenian alliance, with the Heracles type depicted on the obverse of these coins to symbolize the victory of Sparta, the winning side in the Peloponnessian Wars over Athens, as Heracles was a Doric, namely a Spartan hero[128]. Another argument states this league had been formed as an anti-Spartan alliance in 394 B.C., shortly before the Persian fleet commanded by the Athenian admiral Conon defeated the Spartan fleet off Cnidus, with these coins symbolizing the cities' casting off the Spartan yoke through the victory of Conon and as the type of Heracles wrestling with snakes on the obverse of the coins indicates, a Heracles who had been attacked by snakes and who was in trouble[129].

123 Atlan 1993, 35; Tekin 2005^3, 24.

124 Karwiese 1980, 1 ff.; Atlan 1993, 35; Tekin 2005^3, 24. These cities had suffered heavy losses in the power struggle between the Athenians and the Spartans both during and after the Peloponnessian Wars. Since they no longer wanted to be injured by conflicts which did not directly concern them, and since they preferred to be governed by a system of their own choosing, they formed an alliance among themselves.

125 The denomination of the silver coins of the alliance is unclear. Their weights are mainly around 11.00–11.30 gr. This standard was in the value of 2 Aigina *drakhmai* and according to the weight system of Chius?/Rhodes? was commonly employed in that period, of 3 *drakhmai*. Although 3 *drakhmai* wasn't a normal denomination, it raises the matter that the coinage was minted and used only in this particular case, namely for the alliance, as 3 *drakhmai* equals 2 Persian *sigloi*. The Persian system of weights was important, not only because it was used by some Greek cities but also because of the support to Persian politics, in other words, of the payment of donations in Persian coins, *dareikos* and *siglos* (also see Atlan 1993, 35; Tekin 2005^3, 25).

126 Meaning 'The coin of the allies' (= *symmakhikon nomisma*).

127 Hill 1906, 63 ff. fn. 2; Karwiese 1980, 16; Atlan 1993, 35 *lev*. XXXII. 4–12.

128 Cook 1961, 67 ff.; Karwiese 1980, 10 ff.; Tekin 2005^3, 24 f.

129 Hill 1906, 63 ff.; Cawkwell 1956, 69 ff.; 1963, 152 ff.; Schönert-Geiss 1970, 31 ff.; Strauss 1984, 47 fn. 41; Tekin 2005^3, 25; also cf. Atlan 1993, 35.

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Byzantion'dan Constantinopolis'e İstanbul Kuşatmaları, kentin yaklaşık iki bin yıllık geçmişinde karşı karşıya kaldığı kuşatmaların tamamını tek tek ele almamasına rağmen kaynaklarda ön plana çıkanlar üzerine bir tür tam görünüm *-panoptikon-* sunan, Eskiçağ ve Ortaçağ tarihi araştırmalarında gün geçtikçe öne çıkan antik kaynak, epigrafik belge ve nümismatik buluntu çeşitliliğini dikkate alan ve güncel literatüre dayanan bir derleme çalışması.

Kitapta yer alan araştırmalar, kuruluşundan itibaren en yakın komşuları Trakyalılardan başlayarak Hellenler, Persler, Makedonyalılar, Hellenistik krallıklar, Romalılar, Avarlar, Sâsâniler, Araplar, Bulgarlar, Ruslar, Haçlılar ve Osmanlılar tarafından kuşatılan İstanbul'un, sadece kimler tarafından nasıl kuşatıldığı üzerinde durmuyor, aynı zamanda siyasi çekişmelere, iç savaşlarla sonuçlanan anlaşmazlıkların doğurduğu kuşatmalara ve başkentin savunma unsurlarına da dikkat çekiyor.

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